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Bankruptcy:
Activist Investors and Chapter 11
Jared Ellias1
A major shift in Chapter 11 practice in the past decade has been
the emergence of hedge funds that specialize in investing in
distressed debt. Their presence in the reorganization of large firms is
pervasive; in 2009 and 2010, they invested in more than 70% of the
Chapter 11 cases of large firms. Distressed hedge funds wield more
than $100 billion in capital and aim to use their expertise in the
bankruptcy process to profit from investing in the claims of large
distressed firms. Towards that end, they deploy both activist and
passive investing strategies. While recent research has shed some
light on the impact of these funds on the bankruptcy process, much
remains unknown.
Background on Junior Investors in Bankruptcy
Take, for example, one of the most important activist investing
strategies: buying lower-priority claims like unsecured debt and
equity and hiring lawyers to participate in the bankruptcy process. I
refer to this strategy as “junior activism.” Junior activists are wellknown for their willingness to challenge managers and senior
creditors in the board room and the court room. Like activist
investing more generally, junior activism is a source of controversy.
Critics view junior activists as opportunists that file meritless
motions and objections to extract hold-up value settlements. To
quote Wilbur Ross in his testimony to the American Bankruptcy
Institute’s Reform Commission, “[junior creditors] know that
terrorist [litigation] tactics can lead to concessions from
economically superior claimants and that even when they don’t,
litigation sometimes results in decisions that bestow value on the
nominally lower ranking class.”2 In theory, this frivolous litigation is

1. Summarized and excerpted from Jared Ellias, Do Activist
Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11?, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 493 (2016).
2. Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to
Study Reform of Chapter 11 at 3 (2013).
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also thought to increase bankruptcy costs, undermining the Chapter
11 policy goal of maximizing creditor recoveries.
Junior activists, however, believe they counter the perverse
incentives of managers of Chapter 11 debtors. Chapter 11 leaves
managers in control of the bankruptcy process and requires them to
maximize creditor recoveries. In performing this duty, managers face
what economists call a “moral hazard.” If the firm is reorganized in a
transaction that is appraised at a discount to the firm’s true value,
managers and senior creditors can profit at the expense of junior
claimants by extracting value that otherwise might go to junior
constituencies. Junior activists claim they intervene to stop managers
and senior creditors from exploiting their control over the bankruptcy
process to enrich themselves at the expense of junior claimants.
Empirical Study and Findings
Which of these views of junior activism is accurate? I attempted
to answer that question using a hand-collected dataset of 107 large
firms that filed for Chapter 11 in 2009 and 2010. To measure junior
activism, I developed a methodology that I refer to as a “litigation
score.” My intuition was to treat the observable portions of junior
activism—the litigation, their court victories, and the identity of
junior activists—as a proxy for things not reliably observable, such
as out-of-court negotiations. The more litigation—objections to the
debtor’s key motions, requests for judicial relief like motions to
appoint trustees and examiner—the higher the score. This
methodology allowed me to distinguish the cases in which junior
activists were relatively more active from the ones in which they
appeared to play less of a role.
My findings are consistent with the view that junior activists play
an important role in corporate governance that is consistent with
bankruptcy’s policy goals. First, the evidence suggests that junioractivist litigation is associated with an increase in the appraised value
of the restructuring transaction. This supports the view that junior
activists improve Chapter 11. Depending on the facts of the case, the
junior activist might have increased the appraised transaction value
by pushing a reluctant management team into a transaction that
maximized the true value of the firm. Alternatively, the junior
activist might have prevented management and senior lenders from
obtaining an artificially low appraisal from their investment banker.
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Additionally, I examine the market prices of senior claims at the end
of the bankruptcy process and find no evidence that the observed
increase in the appraisal results in the firm being overvalued or
senior creditors undercompensated.
Second, for a subset of the sample, I was able to calculate the
market value of the firm’s outstanding debt and equity on the date the
firm filed for bankruptcy. This allowed me to control for the market’s
recovery expectations at the beginning of the bankruptcy process. I
found that, controlling for changes in credit market conditions and
other important variables, junior activism appears to be positively
correlated with higher creditor recoveries than the market anticipated
prior to the bankruptcy process. This suggests that junior activists
are, at the least, savvy investors. It also provides support for the view
that they contribute expertise that improves the outcome of the
bankruptcy process.
Third, by analyzing bond and loan returns around key
bankruptcy hearings, I found a positive relationship between posthearing returns for junior claimholders and the presence of a junior
activist. This correlation appears to be driven by the junior activist’s
prosecution of objection to management’s motions. While I do not
observe all of the data I would need to come to firm conclusions, the
observed increase in the value of the junior claim does not appear to
be a transfer from senior creditors. This finding, too, is consistent
with the notion that junior activists play a crucial governance role
that checks management’s powers as debtor-in-possession at
important points in the bankruptcy process.
Fourth, by examining the range of estimated value by firms that
recapitalized with supporting investment-banker appraisals, I found
that the range appears to be narrower for the cases with junioractivist involvement. This is consistent with the notion that junior
activists contribute expertise that reduces the randomness of the
appraisal process and, together with the evidence of higher
appraisals, is broadly consistent with the expectation that junior
activists positively influenced the governance of bankrupt firms by
constraining opportunistic underappraisal.
Still, some evidence was consistent with the predictions of the
critics of junior activism. I observed payments outside of the absolute
priority rule in 27% of sample cases. However, the value distributed
outside of the absolute priority rule was relatively small—generally
ranging between 1% and 3% of the appraised transaction value. It
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seems unlikely that these small settlements would make the
investment that junior activists make in lawyer and investmentbanker fees profitable, suggesting that hedge funds would be unlikely
to litigate opportunistically in search of these small observed
payments.
The evidence also linked junior-activist litigation to higher
attorneys’ fees. This makes intuitive sense. After all, if junior
activists are filing objections, the debtor’s attorneys will incur
additional fees in responding to them and preparing for trial.
However, the magnitude of the implied cost increase is relatively
low, and direct bankruptcy costs themselves are a mere 1.3% of the
appraised value of the median sample case. I did not observe a
relationship between junior activism and the length of the bankruptcy
case, which is inconsistent with the worry of critics that overly
litigious hedge funds prolong bankruptcy cases.
Conclusion
The results in the study offer some support both to the claims of
junior activists and to the claims of their detractors. On the whole,
however, the findings are inconsistent with the claim that activist
investors abuse the bankruptcy system by extracting hold-up
payments. I did not find evidence of large payments outside of the
absolute priority rule, and junior activists appear to focus their efforts
on relatively more valuable cases, inconsistent with the expectation
of indiscriminate litigation. Moreover, I found evidence suggesting
that junior activism is correlated with unexpectedly high creditor
recoveries and other corroborating evidence that support the view
that junior activists contribute expertise to bankruptcy cases that lead
to better outcomes.
However, it is important to qualify these results by noting that
my methodology cannot eliminate the possibility that the observed
positive correlation between junior activism and the final appraisal is
better explained as nonrandom and savvy selection of target firms by
sophisticated investors. It does seem unlikely that junior activists
would correctly identify undervalued firms and then reduce their
returns by the millions of dollars they spend on lawyers and
investment bankers to participate in the process, but my results
cannot conclusively reject this possibility. Nonetheless, I do think
that the results shift the burden of proof onto the critics of junior
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activism to show that there is a problem with overly litigious hedge
funds abusing the bankruptcy system. Further research is needed to
learn more about the impact hedge funds might have on the
bankruptcy process, but the results in this study cautiously suggest
that junior-activist investing strategies might be, on average,
beneficial.

